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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
EV1DENCE-INJUNCTION-EXTEN SION OF THE FEDERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE
-Petitioner Rea was indicted for the acquisition of marijuana in violation
of federal law. After evidence obtained by a federal agent by means of an
invalid search warrant had been suppressed in a federal district court, and
the indictment dismissed, the federal agent swore out a warrant for Rea's
arrest in a New Mexico state court. Rea's motion in the federal district
court to enjoin the agent's testimony was denied, and the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.' On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed, injunction granted. In view of the Supreme Court's
supervisory. powers over federal law enforcement officers, a federal officer
may be prevented from testifying or introducing illegally obtained evidence
in either federal or state proceedings in contravention of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure governing searches and seizures. The injunctive
relief is directed at the federal agent, and is not an attempt to disrupt the
state forum. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (Justice Harlan,
with whom Justices Reed, Burton and Minton concur, dissenting).
Historically, the resentment of the American colonists to the notorious
'writs of assistance" 2 ultimately led to the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution The first use of an exclusionary rule to
enforce the fourth amendment was in Boyd v. United States.' However, in
Adams v. New York,' the Supreme Court did not adhere to the Boyd deci-
sion, but utilized the common law rule that evidence which was pertinent to
the issue was admissible, although illegally procured.! Though not express-
ly overruling the Boyd case, the Court refused to apply it to the facts of this
case.
In 1914, the Supreme Court announced its definitive rule of federal
exclusion in the case of Weeks v. United States.' Defendant's home had
been entered and evidence illegally seized on two distinct occasions, once
by state police officers, and again by state police in conjunction with a
United States Marshal. The federal district court held that all the evidence
was admissible, and the Supreme Court reversed, declaring that it was not
error to admit the evidence seized by the state police officers acting inde-
pendently, but that it was error to admit evidence illegally seized by the
joint efforts of the state police and the federal officer.
The rule of the Weeks decision has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court as a mere rule of evidence which could be changed by congressional
'Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
2These were general warrants under which British officers were granted the power
to search homes.
8"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and parti-
cularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
'116 U.S. 616 (1886). The case concerned the constitutionality of a federal statute
authorizing the courts to compel the production of a man's private books and papers,
under the penalty of having the information taken as true if not produced. The
statute was held unconstitutional as violating the fourth and fifth amendments, and
the introduction of those books declared an error.
'192 U.S. 585 (1904). In this case an objection was made to the introduction of
papers which were seized illegally by state officers for use in a state court. The
Supreme Court upheld the state court conviction, and refused to apply the doctrine
of the Boyd case.
'Id. at 596.
'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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enactment, and not as a constitutional mandate imposed by the fourth
amendment.' The Court held that the exclusionary rule was not binding on
the state courts, and in the interests of the federal and state coordinate
system of courts, allowed the states to develop their own rules concerning
exclusion. Tabulation of the states following or rejecting the Weeks rule
of illegally seized evidence shows that the majority, twenty-six states, reject
the exclusionary rule, and twenty-one states adhere to it.!
The majority based their opinion on the Court's supervisory powers
over federal law enforcement agencies, rather than on a constitutional inter-
play between the fourth and fourteenth amendments." Justice Harlan
pointed out in his dissent that this was the first time it had been suggested
that the Court share with the executive department responsibility for the
federal agencies.
The majority opinion relied heavily on McNabb v. United States,"
concerning the enforcement of the federal rules. However, that case in-
volved a federal prosecution for the murder of a federal agent where a con-
fession had been obtained and admitted in violation of a statute for the
protection of prisoners. The Court enforced the federal statute and ex-
pressly stated that, as the court of ultimate review, it was not concerned
with law enforcement practice, except as courts themselves become instru-
ments of the law.
The use of injunctive relief in the instant case appears contrary to
policies developed in previous decisions involving the balance between fed-
eral and state forums in criminal proceedings. In Douglas v. Jeannette,'
the Supreme Court held that the power reserved to the states under the
Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their
courts may be restricted by federal district courts only in obedience to con-
gressional legislation in conformity with article III of the Constitution.
Therefore courts of equity should conform to this policy by refusing to em-
barrass or interfere with threatened proceedings in state courts other than
in exceptional cases.
Another case showing reluctance of the federal courts to interfere by
injunctive process with state criminal proceedings was Stefanelli v. Min-
ard,' which involved a suit to enjoin a New Jersey court from utilizing in
8Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
9Id. at 34, 38, listed thirty states as opposed -to the W1eek8 holding, seventeen in
agreement with it, and one which had not passed on the question. Since that time
four states have changed their position to adopt the Weeks rule. See 5 UTAH L.
REv. 115, 116 n.6 (1956). Prior to the formulation of the concept in the Weeks
case, Montana opposed the doctrine of exclusion in State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 19,
85 Pac. 369, 373 (1906), but expressed adherence to it after the Weeks decision.
In State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574, 52 A.L.R. 454 (1926), federal officers
illegally seized defendant's whiskey-making apparatus and introduced the evidence
in state court proceedings. It was held that the evidence was admissible in the
state court, as no state agents were involved in the seizure.
1o.. . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1.
"318 U.S. 332 (1943).
"319 U.S. 157 (1943). Jehovah's Witnesses had successfully brought suit in a fed-
eral district court to restrain a city from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting them
from soliciting without paying a license tax. It was held that the federal court
should have refused to enjoin the threatened criminal proceedings in the state
courts.
"8342 U.S. 117 (1951).
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a criminal prosecution evidence illegally secured by the state police. The
Supreme Court refused the injunction, reiterating that the federal courts
should refuse to intervene or interfere in state criminal proceedings, and
the Court renewed the concept that equity does not enjoin a criminal prose-
cution.
Substantively, the instant case is at odds with the decision in Wolf v.
Colorado'1  where the Court held (6-3) that in a prosecution in a state court,
for a state crime, the fourteenth amendment did not require the exclusion
of evidence secured by an illegal search and seizure. The fourteenth amend-
ment does subject the power of a state over life, liberty and property to the
requirementg of due process of the law, but in the Wolf case Justice Frank-
furter concluded that due process of law did not command the court or the
states to exclude illegally obtained evidence in state prosecutions for state
crimes. Therefore in the Wolf case, as in previous decisions, the United
States Supreme Court refused to force the exclusionary rule upon the states
by interpreting the fourteenth amendment to require the exclusion of evi-
dence seized ijn contravention of the fourth amendment.
It is submitted that the instant decision in effect accomplished by in-
direction what the United States Supreme Court could not achieve by direct
and unequivocal action. Regarding procedure, the Court overrode a long
list of astute decisions in which it had proclaimed that the federal courts
should not use the injunctive process to intervene and embarrass state court
proceedings. The use of the injunction here completely shackled the New
Mexico trial proceedings, and operated as an enforcement of the federal
exclusionary rule upon a state court. If the New Mexico court had initiated
its proceedings prior to the federal district court action, would the result
have been the same or would the Wolf decision have been followed? Very
likely a "judicial race" would occur, as expressed by Justice Harlan in the
dissent in the Rea case, between a state criminal prosecution and a federal
injunction proceeding. If the government agent had transferred the illegal-
ly obtained evidence to state authorities prior to instituting suit in the fed-
eral court, would the federal court embarrass the state proceedings by de-
manding its return? The intervention of the federal courts in state criminal
proceedings clearly leads to markedly difficult situations in the area of
delicate federal-state relationships.
The Court, in refusing to base the decision on the interrelation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments, essentially avoided the troublesome de-
cision of Wolf v. Colorado where the Court had said the exclusion of il-
legally obtained evidence was not an essential ingredient of due process.
Were the state judicial processes which were declared constitutional in
the Wolf decision suddenly unconstitutional under a new concept of the in-
terplay of the fourth and fourteenth amendments? Did the federal ex-
clusionary rule, which had been considered a mere federal rule of evidence
from its inception, suddenly become a constitutional mandate, without any
reconsideration of views expressed in the Wolf decision? By alluding to
its supervisory powers over federal law enforcement officers, the Court cir-
cumvented the Wolf decision, and disclaimed the presence of a constitutional
question.
'338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Police lawlessness must be deterred, but the control of federal law en-
forcement agencies lies within the executive powers of the federal govern-
ment, not within the judicial processes of the United States Supreme Court.
Without directly overruling the Wolf and Stefanelli decisions, the Court ef-
fectively narrowed and limited their rulings. Pragmatically, the pro-
nouncement of the Rea case imposed the federal exclusionary rule on a na-
tional basis, without regard to the viewpoint of the individual states on the
question of admissibility, and represented a departure from the former
policy of maintaining an equilibrium between the federal and state govern-
ments in law enforcement in criminal prosecutions.
Even if the decision is interpreted in an extremely narrow scope to
mean that the federal injunction will issue against the offending federal
agent only where he attempts in a state criminal prosecution to produce
illegally obtained evidence which has been suppressed in a prior federal pro-
ceeding, the Rea decision to that extent broadens the federal exclusionary
rule by encroaching on the rights of the individual states through the inter-
vention of federal judicial legislation.
JACK H. BoKEY
NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANcE--Plaintiff brought an action for in-
juries suffered when he was struck by the defendant's car while crossing
the street in the middle of the block in a negligently inattentive manner.
The complaint, resting on the last clear chance doctrine, alleged negligence
of the defendant based (1) on her failure to exercise the reasonable means
available to avoid the accident after actually discovering the plaintiff in
peril, and (2) on her failure to exercise reasonable vigilance to discover the
plaintiff in peril due to inattention. The district court sustained a de-
inurrer to both counts and dismissed the action. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Montana, held, reversed and remanded. The doctrine of the last
clear chance is applicable both where the defendant did see and thereafter
failed to exercise the reasonable means available to avoid injuring the plain-
tiff in peril, and also where the defendant negligently failed to see the
plaintiff in peril due to inattention. Sorrels v. Ryan, 281 P.2d 1028 (Mont.
1955) (Chief Justice Adair dissenting).
The basic reasoning underlying the doctrine of the last clear chance is
that the person who has the last clear opportunity to avoid an accident
should bear the burden of the resulting injuries if he fails to take advantage
of his opportunity.' There are four possible situations to which the doctrine
can be applied. An overwhelming majority of the courts allow the plaintiff
to recover in the first two situations: where a defendant is actually aware
of the plaintiff's peril in time to avoid an accident by exercise of reasonable
care and a plaintiff is either (1) in inextricable peril (physically helpless to
escape injury), or (2) in peril due to inattention.! In the third situation,
where a defendant who because of his inattention is unaware of the plain-
tiff's inextricable peril, a clear majority of the courts allow the plaintiff to
recover.' This is supportable on the ground that the plaintiff's negligence
PRossER, TORTS § 52 (2d ed. 1955).
'Annot., 92 A.L.R. 47, 149 (1934).
8Ibid.
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